Griffin Gulledge
Guy Rohrbaugh
Metaphysics
15 September 2011
Davidson/Chisholm Draft 1
Begin by explaining the difference between Chisholm's 'fine-grained' individuation of events and Davidson's 'corse-grained' individuation, including a bit about their respective motivations. How does Chisholm argue in Section 6 that Nixon's being in Washington is distinct from Johnson's successor begin in Washington? How does Davidson respond to this argument (p. 29)? Discuss and evaluate.
Before us lies two philosophers, each with a very different view on how events are individuated from the other. The first, Chisholm, individuates events with a very fine grained scale. The other, Davidson, is less likely to individuate such events. Heretofore, the common theories had not been quite as concerned with the individuation of events themselves but rather more with the events existing at all. To understand the argument, I will first lay out Chisholm’s position as well as one of his very own examples. I will then turn to Davidson and how his theory responds to that very example. In so doing, we will see (clearly, I think) that Chisholm’s theory, though well thought out, simply does not stand well next to that of Davidson.
In his Events and Propositions, Chisholm aims to reduce talk of events to propositions. The idea is to resist recognizing events for their own sake and instead to recognize them as propositions. Chisholm thinks that this is the easiest route and the one which will do the most to explain events, because we already recognize the validity of propositions. To clarify, when Chisholm speaks of propositions, his is speaking of abstracts entities, objects of propositional attitudes, meanings of sentences, and states of affairs. Propositions can be thought of as statements which express an opinion or actuality. The most important of these for our purposes is meanings of sentences and states of affairs. For example, ‘that {Auburn will crush Alabama in football}, that which is bracketed is our proposition (i.e. the emotive expression of fact or opinion). For states of affairs, he is speaking of propositions that change in their truth value. That is to say, statements of fluidity that maintain concreteness in meaning. This surely is a logical way to go. After all, it is easy to see how we already believe in propositions. If events truly are simply propositions, then events exist without qualm.
All the work he wants done by events must be spurred on by ‘one time events with specificity in their properties’. That which is in quotes— one time events with specificity in their properties— is especially important. Chisholm, after all has a fine grained individuation of events. To not meet this standard stated is to be a separate event altogether. It is reminiscent of Liebniz Principle of identical objects wherein those objects which fail to share the exact same spatial and temporal features also fail to be identical. Thus, nothing is truly identical. For Chisholm, any individuation in properties makes two events different. This is the fine grain by which he differs from Davidson. For example, stating that Nixon being in Washington is different from stating that LBJ’s successor being in Washington because the properties exemplified are different. Any differentiation in properties renders a new event altogether, not a propositional variation.
Davidson, on the other hand, does not have such a fine grained view of the individuation of events. What Davidson is more interested in is a kind of semantic theory that explains what we believe logically i.e. the title of his paper The Logical Form of Action Sentences. The best semantic theory is that which will quantify the most about events in a way that physical theories simply do not. He argues that surface grammatical form is lost in regards to finding true logical form, and in this case we must seek out true logical form.
So in this case, our ontological commitments become incredibly important. For example, say that Guy is teaching Ethics. Teaching in this case is used in the active tense as a verb. We know logically that there is
X: (GuyX & EthicsX)
but not necessarily (teachingX). That is to say, there is X such that GuyX and EthicsX but such that we are not still ontologically committed to ‘teaching’. If our ontological commitments aren’t such that events are considered things, then it really isn’t true in the first place that Guy is teaching anything. There is Guy. There is Ethics. There is no teaching. Davidson wants to argue that our logic must quantify events as things such that they exist. If they fail to make events things in and of themselves, then events do not exist. Our logic must consist of the sort of variable polyadicity which allows for predication. In Davidson’s example on Jones buttering toast, he uses that example to show us that we must be committed to buttering as an objective event. Behind the idea of variable polyadicity is the idea that when we break down action sentences into logical form, we can classify events as things. [Need more on this, but not sure how to further explain]
Now one of the problems given by Chisholm, as already stated was that of the successor of LBJ being in Washington and Nixon being in Washington as separate events, which we know they are not. How is this possible? Davidson seems to think that this is possible because of their correspondence to a common truth. Say the common truth is ‘Future President Nixon and LBJ Successor is in Washington’. Nixon is described two ways contained within the same idea in the setence. To be committed to Nixon is to be committed to him as both future president and as LBJ successor. So really, the problem is not in the semantics but in the logical commitments.
Conclusion
