CUP; Preface, Contents, Introduction

In the Introduction to Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Johannes Climacus goes to discusses the systematic dialectic often employed when we talk about faith.  Climacus says it promises everything and yet yields nothing.  So what's the problem with the system?  He seems to think there are 3 problems. I think it would be best to talk a little more in depth about what, precisely, those problems are.

1. The system presupposes faith as something given (a system that has no presuppositions).
2. Further, the system divorces faith from passion; which, in itself, is insulting to faith and shows that faith has never been something that is a 'given'.
3. The system's total presupposition that faith is 'given', so to speak, "dissolves into conceit into which the system  has deluded itself, that it knew what faith is".

What I take Climacus to mean in the first problem is this: in the systematic dialectic of faith, faith is treated as a tool, or, as a means to an end.  What that end may be is up for debate, but the faith is simply a presupposition within the discussion and otherwise irrelevant or overwhelmingly regarded less than it should be. Faith is, in this case, penultimate at best. This is a problem for Climacus, who, it seems, would rather think of faith less as a path or a pair of shoes, but more as the whole journey itself. This is incredibly important in regards to the second problem.

The second problem follows from the first, in that faith, then, is divorced from passion. This is going to be major for Climacus.  Faith can not be seen merely as an objective reality, but as something in relation to us. If faith becomes an objective reality, we are no longer talking about a God in relation to us.  If faith is something given us by God, or at the very least something we have IN RELATION to God, then we can not divorce it from passion.  

Kierkegaard, Fragments 4-5

I am incredibly intrigued and engaged by Kierkegaard's discussion on why God must have become man.  Why, to use his analogy, the King could not simply send his most honorable man in his stead. Why?  Why does this not satisfy the King? Kierkegaards says that the God knew that "between man and man the Socratic relationship is the highest and truest." I was apparently pretty deeply mistaken in my assessment of the Socratic role in Kierkegaard's tale.  I was under the impression that under this system, the Socratic method had been thrown off. It looks as if I was wrong, however, as he says man and man share this relationship.

The Socratic relationship, however, can't bring one to knowledge of the truth. Kierkegaard says "if God had not come himself, all the relations would have remained on the Socratic level; we would not have had the Moment, and we would have lost the Paradox." Kierkegaard thinks that the Teacher had to give man the condition to see the truth, namely, Himself. Without the condition to see the truth, man could never arrive at the truth through any line of Socratic questioning.  I am less concerned with this, the Paradox, and more concerned with the role of the Socratic questioning between two who have been given the condition.

Once two have been given the condition to see the truth and accept that truth, what role does the Socratic play? Socrates' whole idea on the Socratic method is rooted in the pre-existence of the Soul.  The only way I can understand this idea working is in a homeostatic, ecclesiastical manner.  After thinking it out, it seems that the role of the church is to remind one another of the Gospel of Christ (i.e. the Truth). The only way we can do this is if we've been given the condition to see the truth and accepted that truth.  Somehow, be it homeostasis or otherwise, we are united with Christ in our 'salvation'. The only way I can see the Socratic working man to man after the Moment is if, through faith in Christ, we are able to draw forth knowledge from one another by way of our union with Christ. I am confuse what role the Socratic plays between believers.  Perhaps, the Socratic has no role in Salvation but every role in other types of knowledge, whereas the Teacher only deals with salvific truth.

Kierkegaard, Fragments 3: The Folly of Seeking Metaphysical Proof For God

Climacus speaks with fairly strong language in regards to seeking metaphysical proof for the existence of God. "Generally speaking," he says, "it is a difficult matter to prove that anything exists..."  As a student struggling through Metaphysics now, I can attest to the truth of that statement.  It is because of this that Climacus says he "always reason from existence, not toward existence".  This, to me, is incredibly appealing in regards to speaking of God.  He even points out arguments when have been reduced to degrees of being, which to him is silly talk, considering one being can no less be than another, truly.

"As long as I keep hold on the proof, the existence not come out... but when I let go of the proof, the existence is there". Climacus is moving toward the idea that when we form these tightly wound proofs by which we are bound, we make existence nearly formulaic and impossible to recognize.  If we, however, let go of our proof, existence is-- dare I say-- obvious.  That being the case, seeking some sort of metaphysical proof for the existence of God is incredibly useless.

It reminds me a bit of, if you will allow me to draw the parallel, Christian apologist Cornelius Van Til (which I understand is a BIT ironic considering Kierkegaard's attitude toward apologists).  Van Till is famous in Reformed Evangelical circles for Presuppositional Apologetics.  Seeing the folly of a metaphysical proof for or against God, he began to say that if we can not reason for a common 'field of apperception', if you will, then we may not speak of God at all.  Only when we presuppose the existence of God and his revelation can we ever begin to talk about what he may be like or how he acts.  This, it seems, is incredibly similar to where Kierkegaard is headed when he says:

If in the moment of beginning his proof it is not absolutely undetermined whether God exists or not, he does not prove it.

If the relation is not clear at first, allow me to explain. Building off the Kantian idea of disinterest, Climacus thinks that any proof that starts when any idea of whether God does or does not exists will be impossible to prove.  We must be completely disinterested from the result, i.e. disinterested, if we are to prove anything!  And that- that is impossible!  Thus, if we are to reason for God, is must be from him and not toward him.

Kierkegaard, Fragments 1-2: The Importance of "No Mere Outer Cloak"

In his Fragments, Climacus (Soren Kierkegaard) makes an especially important emphasis on the servanthood of The God, The Teacher, or as I will refer to him henceforth, Christ.  This form of a servant, he says is no mere cloak. He says:

He is the God; and yet he has not a resting-place for his head, and he dares not lean on any man lest he cause him to be offended. He is the God; and yet he picks his steps more carefully than if angels guided them, not to prevent his foot from stumbling against a stone, but lest he trample human beings in the dust, in that they are offended by him.

then later:

But the servant form is no mere outer garment, and therefore the God must suffer all things...Every other form of revelation would be a deception in the eyes of love; for either the learner would first have to be changed, and the fact concealed from him that this was necessary; or there would be permitted to prevail a frivolous ignorance of the fact that the entire relationship was a delusion.

These two quotes are incredibly important to understand why Climacus thinks it important that the servant-form is no mere cloak.  First, we must remember the point about a man in Error.  Climacus thinks that one who is in Error can not merely be turned from error as the same man.  As he says in Chapter 1 of Fragments, there must be a new birth.  God loves, he says, those in Error though only despite the Error.  In love, he wishes to turn them from it.  And thus enters the brilliance of the first quote above:  God, in his love moves carefully, not restraining himself, but rather orchestrating all things wisely to bring man from Error to his love.

However, God simply "not trampling" humans is not the full extent of love.  That, it seems, would be a mere outer garment of servant-form.  True servant form suffers, says Climacus. He must suffer as we suffer to bring us from our suffering to his love/glory.  Thus the second quote above.  The point that follows, then, is that anything other than total revelation of himself would be a mere cloak of love.  And yet, God, truly loving has chosen to embody himself as we are embodied.  This same God, Climacus notes, than if anyone sees they die, has left his true glory to embody the servant form to bring us out of our servant form. Not unlike the story of the King, this kingly God desires to bring those he loves out of slavery to royalty.

True love would not deceive the one into thinking that they are not in need of change.  Nor would the one be told of how they fall short to the God and yet be allowed to ignorantly think they are accepted.  To do so would make the entire relationship a delusion.  The latter can not happen.  The former is not love. Both would be a mere 'outer cloak of love, not true love'. So what?  The God had to embody servant form.  A mere outer cloak would not save, would not bring rebirth.  As Climacus notes, love does not merely alter the beloved, it alters itself.

 

Triads, D-F: What It Is To Know

As an Eastern father, Gregory of Palamas does not hold to a sort of catechetical knowledge of God.  This cataphatic knowledge, he thinks, is misguided.  He quotes another man in his writings who says "...the observance of the commandment can not remove the darkness of ignorance from the soul."  So then, the question must be this: What is it to know of God?  Can we know anything? As Gregory says, "What does not even remove ignorance cannot give knowledge!"

Certainly he does not think that God is altogether unknowable.  There is a sense in which we can know him. But what sense is it? Gregory speaks of contemplation much more than knowledge.  It's an interesting distinction he makes, one in which the contemplate God without truly knowing all of him.  Gregory says that if we use 'knowledge' in the transcendental sense, "...all contemplation, which depends on knowledge, since nothing surpasses the indwelling and manifestation of God in us, nothing equals it, and nothing approaches it."  Contemplation depends on a certain kind of knowledge, but truly what is happening is we are contemplating the depths of our union with God, our deification in Christ. There is, to Gregory, this "human composite, which is united to His hypostasis" that we find ourselves contemplating. So in contemplating the power and mercy of God, etc., effectual in us and in contemplating the divine without some sort of certain catechesis, we grow more into his deity.

I wonder, however, to what extent this apophatic reaches.   Clearly not to the Trinity, since he uses the Biblical terms of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in regards to God.  Yet, he doesn't seem to try to explain the Trinity.  He does, however, speak of our hypostasis with Christ in our deification speaking of the union of deity and likeness of man in Christ.  Quite the doctrinal statement.  The Eastern church is a Nicene Creed endorsing church.  So perhaps he simply thinks that he can not expand any further than the Creed.  It seems to me a profound contradiction to imply that we can "know" of God, simply contemplate and subscribe to an apophatic type of theology and yet speak of the hypostasis of Christ.  Perhaps I have botched his formula, but he seems to be working from a theological contradiction.

Gregory, Triads A,B: Philosophy Does Not Save

Are we then to say that those who hold such a philosophy possess the wisdom of God, or even a human wisdom in general?...In my estimation, this "wisdom" is not even worthy of the appellation "human"...

What then should be the work and the goal of those who seek wisdom of God in creatures?  Is it not the acquisition of the truth and the glorification of the Creator? 

It's clear Gregory doesn't think that philosophy saves.  At one point he goes so far as to call it "demonic".  That's a bit of a stretch, in my opinion.  But why would he do that? Philosophy, he thinks, doesn't lead to a glorification of God.  Somehow this has to work into his entire body of theology.  So here's what I want to say:  Gregory, as stated above, doesn't think philosophy possesses the wisdom of God; in fact, it cannot, since it does not lead to the glorification of God and acquisition of truth in God.

Part of Gregory's theology is that we are "in Christ" in such a way that we experience him.  Due to his apophatic beliefs, we do not experience him in some of of systematic theology or mere intellectual assent, but something altogether different.  I want to call it a mingling of energies.  In so doing, we need much more than truths about God.  We must encounter God.  What philosophy does is objectifies God in such a way that he is not experienced or contemplated; rather, he is just thought about.  Due to this as the aim of his full theology, Gregory thinks philosophy not only does not save, but is demonic.  From his framework it makes perfect sense, even if it isn't necessarily right.

Anselm, Guanilo

In Anselm's Reply to Guanilo, there is a particular section which I think requires special attention. It is the following

...But I say with certainty that if it can be so much as thought to exist, it must necessarily exist. For that which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of as beginning to exist.  By contrast, whatever can be thought to exist but does not in fact exist, can be thought of as beginning to exist.  Therefore, it is not the case that that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought to exist, but does not in fact exist.  If, therefore, it can be thought to exist, it does necessarily exist.

Anselm obviously thinks there is some sense in which an object conceived exists.  Perhaps I'm a bit confused, but he seems to be saying there is a sense in which our thoughts exists, in some sort of way.  As thoughts of a thing exists, necessarily that thing exists within the thought.  That must be the only way in which he thinks that things come into existence through thought.  When he says "whatever can be thought to exist but does not in face exist, can be thought of as beginning to exist," I do not hold him to an idea such as us having a divine creative power.

It is clear Anselm doesn't think we are "Creators" in that sense.  Rather, Anselm is saying more about the power of thinking, I believe, than about the creative power of man.  Thoughts must exist, perhaps not tangibly, but in some sort of objective, spatial-temporal sense.  That is the only way is that the talk he is using can work. So if one should stand on a rooftop and shout loudly and with full conception "UNICORNS EXIST!", then they do, in some sense.  They exist as a thought conceived in the mind, a thought which can not be unthought, and in that sense, they exist.

Anselm is quite the conundrum, but he is altogether non-committal. He doesn't explicitly say we can create with out mind.  He never tries to say we can think things into existence.  But he implies that very thing.  But what is the nature of that existence?  I don't see any way it could be more than simply a conceived thought. That which is thought, exists necessarily in some way, but not necessarily tangibly.  If this is not what he's thinking, it's pretty clear he is wrong.  As it is, it's not really clear if he's wrong or not- in fact, it's not really clear what he's trying to do at all.

Anselm, Proslogion

In his Proslogion, Anselm give a proof for the existence of God.  Of the major parts of this proof, Chapters 2 and 3 are likely the most important to his argument.  Chapter 2 is "That God truly exists.  Chapter 3 is "That he cannot be thought to not exist".  In chapter 2, Anselm makes an important move; namely, that nothing greater than God can be thought to exist. He then goes on to say "that which is greater cannot be thought cannot exist only in the understanding.  For if it exists only in the understanding, it can be thought to exist in reality, as well, which is greater."

I must admit, I'm a bit confused with the move Anselm is trying to make. A sounds a bit like the greatest thing that can be thought can be understood therefore must necessarily exist.  Obviously, since it's the greatest thing that can be thought, it can not be thought that there is that which is greater. Regardless, his point is that God exists.  That's really all we need to get to his more important point which is "That he cannot be thought not to exist."

Anselm doesn't think that anyone could think of God as nonexistent.  Certainly it is absurd to conceive of something from nonexistence.  If nonexistence is some sort of property of an object, then the object doesn't exist, and therefore has no properties.  It reminds me of Descartes ontological argument, which, though not a logical proof, simply can not be wrong.  If he thinks, he is.  If he thinks he is, he couldn't have thought in the first place.  Same logic applies here, wherein if God is thought to not exist, then he isn't thought.  The problem I have with this is that it leads that God CERTAINLY exist. I'm not so sure.  Certainly, it follows that God may exist or could exist or is conceivable of existing.  But I'm not sure that conceiving in the mind necessitates existence.  That seems to be the move Anselm is trying to make.  And in terms of 'seeming', it seems to be wrong.