Kierkegaard, Fragments 3: The Folly of Seeking Metaphysical Proof For God

Climacus speaks with fairly strong language in regards to seeking metaphysical proof for the existence of God. "Generally speaking," he says, "it is a difficult matter to prove that anything exists..."  As a student struggling through Metaphysics now, I can attest to the truth of that statement.  It is because of this that Climacus says he "always reason from existence, not toward existence".  This, to me, is incredibly appealing in regards to speaking of God.  He even points out arguments when have been reduced to degrees of being, which to him is silly talk, considering one being can no less be than another, truly.

"As long as I keep hold on the proof, the existence not come out... but when I let go of the proof, the existence is there". Climacus is moving toward the idea that when we form these tightly wound proofs by which we are bound, we make existence nearly formulaic and impossible to recognize.  If we, however, let go of our proof, existence is-- dare I say-- obvious.  That being the case, seeking some sort of metaphysical proof for the existence of God is incredibly useless.

It reminds me a bit of, if you will allow me to draw the parallel, Christian apologist Cornelius Van Til (which I understand is a BIT ironic considering Kierkegaard's attitude toward apologists).  Van Till is famous in Reformed Evangelical circles for Presuppositional Apologetics.  Seeing the folly of a metaphysical proof for or against God, he began to say that if we can not reason for a common 'field of apperception', if you will, then we may not speak of God at all.  Only when we presuppose the existence of God and his revelation can we ever begin to talk about what he may be like or how he acts.  This, it seems, is incredibly similar to where Kierkegaard is headed when he says:

If in the moment of beginning his proof it is not absolutely undetermined whether God exists or not, he does not prove it.

If the relation is not clear at first, allow me to explain. Building off the Kantian idea of disinterest, Climacus thinks that any proof that starts when any idea of whether God does or does not exists will be impossible to prove.  We must be completely disinterested from the result, i.e. disinterested, if we are to prove anything!  And that- that is impossible!  Thus, if we are to reason for God, is must be from him and not toward him.